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Abstract 
 
Generalisations play a major role in social science knowledge. However, their specific 
features as they appear in the social sciences have never been clarified. Yet, it is argued that 
the social sciences can do without them and the special methodology that supports them, 
namely statistics. However, searching for generalisations in the social sciences is not part and 
parcel of an attempt at making the social sciences bend to the positivistic ideal-type of the 
natural sciences. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The surge in interest for post-modernist studies and the hermeneutic methodology during the 
last twenty years has, of course, many sources. A large part of political science deals with 
political thought, where the use of empirical methods of research has little or no relevance. 
Perhaps the same is true, more or less, of normative and mathematical political theory. I have 
no argument with this. What I wish to focus upon is that part of political science which is 
made up of analyses of the world of micro behaviour or actions and the macro world of 
regimes or polities. Without a statistical approach, our knowledge about this external world 
will suffer.  
 
I do not wish to claim that micro or macro research into politics can only be done within a 
statistical framework. This would amount to an exaggeration as useless as the post-modernist 
claim that all research with more than 4-5 cases run the risk of the allegation: rubbish in – 
rubbish out. Why try to deny the relevance of case studies? Why deny that the comparative 
methods of agreement and difference can be put to ingenious use? Yet, allowing for the 
fertility of other approaches than the statistical one, I would still wish to argue that the 
statistical framework offers a some great benefits both in micro and macro research, if out 
goal is to understand reality, and not interpret texts or speeches. 
 
Attempting to understand politics as it occur every day among citizens (micro) or in our social 
systems (macro), we need generalisations. The social sciences employ generalisation that are 
different in character from the natural sciences. Failure to recognize this leads automatically 
to the accusation of positivistic bias against the social sciences. If positivism is bad, then 
perhaps we should avoid doing research on large N:s using statistics?  
 
The purpose of this article is to try to remove the charge of neo-positivism by identifying the 
nature of the generalisations that statistical research looks for in political science. I will then 
give three examples of how such generalisations play a vital role in understanding what is 
happening in politics. 
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SOCIAL SCIENCE GENERALISATIONS 
 
Although much of political research deals with single events or unique phenomena, the need 
for generalisations is obvious when one reflects somewhat at how we go about things. I will 
take three examples below: the new G8 policy towards Africa, the emergence of 
homosexuality as a major cleavage and the question of Muslim retardation. Elucidating these 
problems of high political relevance one would have to find data about the average African 
country, its predicament, as well as the average attitudes towards homosexuality in the 
electorate and finally the general belief patterns among Muslims. Stating and validating such 
generalisations is what much political science is all about. It definitely requires the 
employment of a statistical methodology. 
 
Generalisations about the conditions for promoting economic development by means of 
public policy in Sub-Saharan Africa or generalisations about attitudes in mass politics state 
essential things about reality. They describe the average case or trend. It is true that one case 
(country or individual) may deviate far from the average score. In a sense, averages are not 
true of any single case. Thus, they may be suspected of being superficial. Post-modernist 
methodology would favour instead a in depth analysis of one case – but it has little inductive 
power. Generalisations must be more reliable than case studies as the number of cases in the 
universe covered, N, increases. 
 
Is this positivism? I would answer NO if we mean by “generalisations” the same as law like 
statements in the natural sciences. In the social science, all generalisations have a space and 
time component. Only theoretical economics strives to establish generalisations about human 
nature. When we speak about theorizing a phenomenon in the social sciences, we do not have 
the ambition to unravel eternal truths, as it were. We simply want to find out what things look 
like for the moment, on average that is.  
 
The analysis of the presently existing reality is not journalism. Although the reality of the 
social sciences is not the past, which is the property of historians, but the present world, the 
social sciences attempt to penetrate deeper than what a mere journalistic analysis may do. To 
achieve this, generalisations are necessary. They state what is characteristic of phenomena, 
going beyond the accidental or contingent. However, they need not establish universal laws of 
social systems, as it were. 
 
These crucial generalisations have a large range, as they may deal with both micro and macro 
properties, behaviour as well as attitudes, actions as well as expectations. However, they do 
not constitute laws of nature, as it were. Putting forward such generalisations and finding 
evidence for or against them is a core activity in the social sciences. They require the same 
combination of theoretical imagination and serious attention to data that is typical of the 
natural sciences.  
 
I will take three examples of such key generalisations below. First, I will ask where the chief 
difficulty lies in supporting Sub-Saharan Africa in the effort to move it out of poverty. 
Answering this question calls for a macro generalisation about the role of African government 
in the underdevelopment process of Africa since independence, i.e. a set of generalisations 
about the political systems of Africa. Second, I will ask why homosexuality has become such 
a major issue in the political of advanced societies. This would only be possible, if the 
electorate supports the claims of gay and lesbian groups – a set of generalisations that refer 
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ultimately to individual attitudes in mass politics. Although the emergence of the political of 
homosexuality involves developments in political and legal theory, without the backing from 
strong social groups the politics of homosexuality would never have received the attention 
necessary to change the status quo of established rights and duties. Here, the key micro 
generalisation deals with mass attitudes in the electorate. Finally, I will examine the explosive 
question about civilisation differences by looking at mass attitudes towards modernity, which 
is again a matter of micro research. 
 
Thus, the generalisation we search for in order to analyse the external reality may be macro or 
micro, they may be based upon a small number of observations or a huge number, as N may 
vary from 20 to 100 000. Yet, only statistical tools can allow us to find and support these key 
tools of knowledge about the world out there. 
 
 
REJECTION OF SUBJECTIVISM 
 
One radical bend of post-modernist methodology denies the possibility of capturing reality. It 
argues that social reality is indeterminate or that that it is made up of values which cannot be 
studied scientifically. I will rebut these two claims. 
 
a) Indeterminism: social actions and social systems do not follow regularities in the 
same way as natural phenomena. A number of arguments have been formulated in 
order to deliver this conclusion, such as the freedom of the will, the complexity of 
social systems, the intentionality of human action, the stochastic nature of social 
interaction, etc. 
 
I will merely state that I do not know whether determinism applies to social systems, if it 
really is true of nature in the first place. However, this does not alter the fundamental point 
made here, namely that generalisations constitute an essential part of the social sciences, with 
no pretence to the effect that they are lawlike statements. 
  
 
b) Values: scientific laws cannot cover human actions since values play a fundamental 
role in social actins and systems and they are outside of science as a value free 
enterprise. 
 
This argument does not distinguish between the value orientations of actors and the value 
premises of the scholar. If this distinction is clearly made, then nothing prevents the conduct 
of research into value orientations, finding some general patterns among these, formulated in 
generalisations. I will offer a few examples of such generalisations over value orientations 
today.  
 
 
TEMPORARY SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
 
The object of the social sciences, corresponding to the generalisations they search to find and 
establish with evidence, is not some eternally true fabric of universe or the essential 
components of all forms of life. In stead the social sciences enquire into the social structures 
that condition behaviour in the world we are living in today. Thus, the concepts employed 
include always a time or space reference, meaning that they are not universally valid ones.  
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In the philosophy of the social sciences one has debated whether they are nomothetical or 
ideographical. However, this distinction does not help capturing the special features of the 
social sciences, as they are to be placed somewhere in between these two horns. The social 
sciences analyse temporary structures such e.g. the different family patterns in the world 
today, the European Union in the 21rst century and the emerging market economies in Eastern 
Europe. This temporary or spatial aspect of social structures explains both the quest for 
relevance (positive) so typical of the social sciences and the frequent criticism of social 
science works that they are not up to date (negative). 
 
The quest for relevance looms no doubt very large in the social sciences. Analyses have a 
very short life span, as new developments arrive changing the temporary structures. Dynamics 
is worth more than statics. This emphasis upon relevance opens up for the criticism that the 
social sciences are merely informed journalism. Although the social sciences study what I call 
temporary structures, it is not a question about single stories. It is not only the method that is 
different, but also the focus. What interests the social sciences is what single stories entail in 
terms of generalisations. It is what is typical in the occurrence of events that interets the social 
scientist. Thus, the focus is upon generalisation uncovering temporary structures. Let me give 
three examples of such temporary structures. 
 
 
 
 
MACRO GENERALISATIONS: HELPING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
The predicament in Sub-Saharan Africa is more and more becoming a major policy issue in 
the period of globalisation. The alarming and disturbing signs have multiplied in the 21rst 
century, as anarchy, civil war and famine threaten large parts of the population in several 
countries. The G8 has finally decided to embark on a concerted effort. But what to do? The 
choice of a proper strategy depends, of course, upon the definition of the problem as well as 
the existence of available strategies. 
 
The African agenda of the G8 summit included several strategies, from peace keeping to debt 
relief. One action alternative is described as follows: ”An offer to work towards spending half 
or more of the G8's annual new development aid - about $6bn - on African nations that 
govern justly” (BBC News, 22 June). What lies behind this conditional action plan is the omni 
presence in African countries of the flaw of corruption. How to pin down this phenomenon? 
 
Using generalisations, one would employ a macro index to derive an overall picture of a 
country and then compare its score with global or regional averages. Table 1 presents such a 
generalisation employing the so-called transparency index measuring perceived corruption. 
 
Table 1. Perceived corruption 2001-4 
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Source: http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi 
 
 
The Eta squered score amounts to .60 meaning that these groups are characterized by different 
levels of corruption. Africa scores low on this index. No one claims that these averages for 10 
groups of countries in the world is true of anything except the early 21rst century as an 
approximation. Thus, it is not a scientific law. The level of corruption may change for the 
better or for the worse, depending upon several factorts. Thus, countries may change, moving 
up or down the transparency index. However, these scores are far from accidental or mere 
contingencies. They may guide action as vital information about what to expect in terms of 
other country characteristics, such as democracy and affluence. Look at Diagram 1 and 2 
below, relating the occurrence of corruption to democracy and to GDP. 
 
 
 6
Diagram 1. Corruption and Democracy 
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Based upon corruption scores for some 146 countries of the world, Diagram 1 tests the 
prediction that democracy will be affected with a positive finding amounting to a correlation 
of .6. Similarly, Diagram 2 tests the prediction that affluence will be affected, again with a 
positive finding with a correlation at .77. 
 
 
Diagram 2. Corruption and Affluence 
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Thus, the country generalisations about corruption at the beginning of the 2irst century do not 
contain any eternal laws about social systems, but they capture a general set of phenomena 
that are interconnected: bad governance – instable democracy – low affluence. These macro 
findings are highly relevant for establishing a strategy to do something in relation to the 
dismal predicament of Sub-Saharan Africa today. Macro properties of a country may be 
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highly informative although they are not derived from positivistic laws about human nature. 
Such generalisation may, however, also be based upon micro data. 
 
 
MICRO GENERALISATIONS: GENDER AND HOMOSEXUALITY AS A SOCIAL 
CLEAVAGE 
 
Sex may be looked upon as a new forthcoming cleavages in the post-modern society. Sex and 
politics have become intertwined in a few highly salient issues pertaining to gender and 
homosexuality as well as their recognition in politics.  
 
We will examine below several aspects of sex as a cultural cleavage, including: (a) Is there a 
marked difference between men and women when it comes to the attitude towards gender 
equality? (b) Does the attitude towards gender equality matter for social values? We start with 
the macro question, probing into a few determinants of the country variation in gender 
equality. Then we will turn to the micro question where we will employ the same research 
strategy that was used in the analysis of values above. To measure sex as a set of cultural 
cleavages, we employ the following two types of indicators: (1) Macro indices: For 
measuring gender equality at the macro level across countries we employ. (a) Gender-related 
development index (GDI) as it has been developed by the UNDP team producing the annual 
Human Development Report - from 1995 it contains the GDI. Briefly GDI measures the 
relative position of females to males with respect to life expectancy, education and standard of 
living. (b) Gender empowerment measure (GEM) was also first presented in 1995 and it is a 
composite index on gender inequality in relation to “economic participation and decision-
making, political participation and decision-making and power over economic resources” 
(UNDP 2004 270). (c) Female representation in parliament measured as the percentage of 
women in parliament (second chamber if a bicameral system) (WOMAN). These three 
measures will refer to data for the early years of the 21st century, i.e. around 2000 to 2004.  
 
In addition to these three macro based indices, we will also use: (2) Micro index: We will use 
a micro derived index on gender equality, based on aggregated attitudes on gender issues, 
available from the 3rd and 4th wave of the World Values Studies (Inglehart et al. 2000 and 
2004) (Gender Equality Index; GEQ ). The items employed for constructing the index are the 
following ones: On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do (strongly 
disagree); When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (strongly 
disagree); A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl (strongly 
disagree); A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled (strongly disagree); If a 
woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn’t want to have a stable 
relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove? (Strongly approve) (cf Inglehert and 
Norris 2003b: 69). The variables have been recoded so that a positive value stands for gender 
equality and then a factor analysis has been employed to arrive at a gender equality index; the 
same procedure has been applied for the 3rd  (1995-97) and 4th  (1999-2002) waves of the 
WVS. Since the scores for the two periods strongly covary predicted scores based on the 3rd 
wave will be used as the country scores in the forthcoming analysis. 
 
Figure 1 gives the size of the groups with different orientations towards gender equality, 
drawing upon the entire sample from all the countries within the VWS. 
 
Figure 1 : Opinions on Gender Equality (GEQ) (percentages) 
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Note : The GEQ index has been rescaled in the following way : 0 = lowest thru -1,5 ; 1 = -1,5 
thru -0,5 ; 2 = -0,5 thru 0,5 ; 3 = 0,5 thru 1,5 ; and 1,5 thru highest ; weighted N = 46 564. 
Sources : See Appendix 11.1. 
 
Figure 1 indicates that in advanced countries there is a cleavage between those who strongly 
endorse (3 + 4) and those who are hesitant or negative (0 + 1). We assume now that the basic 
attitude towards acceptance of homosexuality is connected with the gender equality 
orientation. To validate this assumption about a basic sex cleavage in advanced countries we 
employ the VWS. 
 
In order to derive an index of value orientation towards homosexuality, we employ a micro 
based indicator in order to construct macro scores. For attitudes towards homosexuality we 
employ the following response item from the WVS: Please tell me whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: homosexuality (scores from 1 
(=never justifiable) to 10 (=always justifiable). The advantages of the micro based indices on 
gender and homosexuality is that they allow for both macro and micro enquiries into the 
sources of such value orientations. Figure 11.2 shows the distribution in the entire sample of 
respondents in all countries concerning the orientation towards homosexuality. 
 
Figure 2 : Opinion on justifiablity of homosexuality (percentages) 
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Note : The scale goes from 1 (= never justifiable) to 10 (=always justifiable) ; weighted N = 
85 853. 
 
Sources : See Appendix 
 
Let us now enquire into these two value orientations, gender on the one hand and 
homosexuality on the other hand, and attempt to find some of their determinants, either on the 
macro level (countries) or with micro data (individuals). 
 
The micro based index upon gender equality, taken from survey data in the WVS), may now 
be related to the macro based indices. Interestingly, the macro variation derived from micro 
data is strongly correlated with the variation in gender empowerment, a macro based index – 
see Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Gender equality and Gender empowerment (r= ,856; N= 47) 
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Sources: See Appendix  
 
Thus, societies where gender equality in strongly endorsed in citizen attitudes are more or less 
the same societies where a strong development of gender empowerment has taken place. At 
the macro-level it is evident that gender differentiates between countries, whether gender is 
measured by macro based indices or attitudinal data as used in a micro based index.  
 
Value orientations condition public policy, at least in the long run. Thus, the growing political 
saliency of homosexuality would be impossible without value change in the basic attitudes 
towards sex in the population. Let us look at the support for homosexuality, first with 
individuals and second at the macro level. The micro sources of a positive evaluation of 
homosexuality are found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Attitudes to homosexuals and gender, age, education and income: eta correlations 
 
Gender Age Education Income 
Group Homosex. Group Homosex. group Homosex. group Homosex 
Male 3,07 15-29 yrs 3,51 Lower 2,77 Lower 2,85 
 10
Female 3,48 30-49 yrs 3,36 Middle 3,37 Middle 3,21 
  50 + yrs 2,94 Upper 4,05 Upper 3,60 
        
Eta ,066 Eta ,072 Eta ,149 Eta ,097 
        
 
Sources: See Appendix  
 
That culture matters for homosexuality is strongly confirmed in Table 2 
 
Table 2. Regression: attitudes to homosexuals and value orientations, gender, age, education 
and income (WVS 4th wave 1999-2002) 
 
Independent variables Regression coefficient t-stat 
Traditional/secular rational 1,149 73,90 
Gender Equality orientation (GEQ) ,748 52,98 
Post-Materialist ,530 24,24 
Gender ,097 3,64 
Age -,067 -3,98 
Education -,048 -2,51 
Income ,039 2,26 
Constant 2,146 25,90 
R square ,310  
N 30289  
 
Sources: See Appendix 
 
 
Just as individuals differ in their support for homosexuality, so do societies differ in their 
acceptance of homosexuality? The macro picture is well captured by culture on the one hand 
and economic modernisation on the other hand (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Attitudes to homosexuals and cultural factors: Pearson’s correlation 
 
Cultural factors Correlation Attitudes to 
homosexuals 
Protestantism (LN) r ,475 
 Sig ,000 
 N 77 
Islam (LN) r -,484 
 Sig ,000 
 N 77 
Iberian legacy r ,109 
 Sig ,371 
 N 69 
Family system (Todd) r ,762 
 Sig ,000 
 N 77 
Sources: See Appendix 
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One may relate the attitudes towards homosexuality to the gender value orientations. Figure 4 
shows how they correlate strongly at the macro level. 
 
Figure 11: 7. Gender equality orientations (GEQ) and attitudes to homosexuals (r=.78; N = 
56) 
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Sources: See Appendix  
 
But both these value orientations – gender and homosexuality – are strongly supported in 
societies with a high level of modernisation and the so-called post-modern society. - see 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 : Human development and attitudes to homosexuality (r= .74 ; N = 76) 
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Value change is a fundamental force behind politics and the making of new public policy. The 
policies towards women empowerment and the acceptance of homosexuality in law would not 
have come about without the powerful currents of value orientations among citizens 
supporting these developments. There is a cleavage in advanced societies between those who 
endorse the new politics of sex as against those who oppose it. Attitudes towards gender and 
homosexuality are connected at the micro level. And their occurrence on the macro level is 
strongly embedded in major cultural aspects of society. 
 
 
MICRO GENERALISATIONS: ARE THE BELIEFS OF MUSLIMS DIFFERENT? 
 
The emergence of Islamic terrorism on a major scale as witnessed in the attacks on New 
York, Madrid and London raises a few questions for scientific enquiry. Muslim 
fundamentalism may be approached in several ways. One cannot deny the relevance of an 
interpretative approach attempting the isolate the sources of fundamentalism in Islam by 
examining various schools in Islamic thought. Nor can one neglect an historical examination 
of the evolution of major events in the fundamentalist story, such as the victory of 
Wahhabism in Saudia Arabia and the coming of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Yet, to 
understand the place of Islamic fundamentalism in Muslim and Non-Muslim societies it is 
necessary to find out whether fundamentalist doctrines have mass support with Muslims 
around the world. This is a research task that looks for generalisations about mass beliefs 
among ordinary people. Using surveys we have the possibility today of reaching out rendering 
a picture of differences in belief systems among people in the Muslim civilisation in contrast 
to people in other civilisations. The larger the N that such surveys are based upon, the better 
inductive conclusions we can make, all other things identical. These generalisations should 
hold true today without any claim to universality, whatever that claim could imply for the 
social sciences, given the fact that social systems always change more or less quickly. 
 
Below I will examine a few belief items in order to illuminate whether Muslims in general 
support fundamentalist values. Such an enquire can best be done by putting the beliefs of 
Muslims against those of Non-Muslims. Again, the possibility of both macro and micro 
conclusions are open, as the views of individuals can be aggregated to averages for countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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In the great books in the philosophy of science, the specific nature of social science 
generalisations has not been pinned down. It is believed that the social sciences go about 
searching for eternal truths about human nature and social systems. This is a completely 
wrong account of the conduct of enquiry in the social sciences. 
 
Instead, the social sciences focus upon the establishment and use of generalisations that are 
specific to time or space.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix. Micro-level data 
 
Abbreviation Description  Variables in Inglehart et al. 2004 
AGE Age group; recoded as: 15-29 = 
1, 30-49 = 2, 50 + = 3 
V225(x003r2) 
EDUCATION Educational level; recoded as: 
lower = 1, middle = 2, upper = 3 
V226(x025r) 
GENDER Gender as a dummy variable; 
male = 1, female = 2 
V223(x001) 
GEQ Gender equality orientation 
index achieved thru applying a 
factor analysis on five items 
V78(c001(recoded)), 
V110(d019(recoded)), 
V112(d023(recoded)), 
V118(d059), V119(d060) 
HOMOSEXUALS Justifiability of homosexuality 
going from never (=1) to always 
(=19) 
V208(f118) 
INCOME Income level; recoded as: lower 
= 1, middle = 2, upper = 3  
V236(x047r) 
Post-materialist 
orientation 
Postmaterialism orientation 
index based on four items 
y002 
Survival/Self-
expression orientation 
Index measuring survival vs. 
self-expression values; see 
Inglehart and Baker 2000: 24 for 
the construction of the index 
survself 
Traditional/secular 
rational orientation 
Index measuring traditional vs. 
secular-rational values; see 
Inglehart and Baker 2000: 24 for 
the construction of the index 
tradrat5 
 
 
Appendix. Macro-level data  used 
 
Abbreviation Description Sources 
Family system Classification of countries as belonging to family types 
according to degree of individualism where the 
Based on Todd 
(1983) 
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absolute nuclear family scores high and the African 
family system score low 
GDI Gender-related development index; based on 
estimations for different number of years 
UNDP (2000-
2004) 
GDP 1999 GDP per capita expressed as PPP in US$ CIA (2000) 
GEM Gender empowerment measure; based on estimations 
for different number of years 
UNDP (2000 – 
2004) 
GEQ Gender equality index; aggregated to the national 
level, based on both the 3rd and the 4th wave of WVS 
Inglehart et al. 
2000, 2004 
HDI Human development index; based on estimations for 
different number of years 
UNDP (2000-
2004) 
HOMOSEXUALS Attitudes to homosexuals aggregated to the national 
level, based on both 3rd and the 4th wave of WVS 
Inglehart et al. 
2000, 2004 
Iberian legacy Legacy of Iberian colonial rule as a dummy variable 
where 1 = Iberian legacy, 0 = no such legacy 
Based on de 
Blij (1996, pp. 
496-97) 
Islam (LN) Percentage of the population estimated to adhere to the 
Muslim creed around 2000; natural logarithm 
Barrett et al 
2001 
Protestantism 
(LN) 
Percentage of the population estimated to adhere to the 
Protestant creed around 2000; natural logarithm 
Barrett et al 
2001 
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